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Abstract : Using EUROMOD, we cross-validate two types of micro-data presently available in the 
Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, administrative data on one hand and survey data on the other hand. 
While  administrative  data,  extracted  from  the  recently  implemented  Social  Security  Data 
Warehouse, contain information of the whole population of Luxembourg (449,000 observations) in 
2003, survey data, extracted from the Luxembourg household panel PSELL3/EU-SILC for 2004 
(incomes  from  2003),  is  a  representative  sample  of  around  3,600  private  households  (9,800 
individuals) living in Luxembourg with detailed information on incomes, household structure and 
other socio-economic dimensions. As a concrete application of this cross-validation, we analyze the 
2001-2002 tax reform in Luxembourg. The main aspects of this reform are the reduction of the 
number of the tax brackets and the fall of the maximal marginal tax rate (from 46% in 2000 to 42% 
in 2001 and to 38% in 2002). The distributional effects of the tax reform are measured in terms of 
losers and winners, change in inequalities and poverty rates. The results issued from different types 
of  input  data  are  compared  for  cross-validation  and  allow  us  to  emphasize  methodological 
difficulties as well as to underline the advantages and limitations of each dataset. 
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1.    INTRODUCTION 
 
The building-up of a comprehensive Social Security Data Warehouse was launched in Luxembourg 
a few years ago, the first operational dataset of which was recently made available for the year 
2003.  
 
Regarding  the  social  debate,  these  administrative  data  might  be  seen  as  a  complement  to  the 
“Luxembourg  household  panel/European  Union  Statistics  on  Income  and  Living  Conditions” 
(PSELL3/EU-SILC) survey data which have sustained the analysis of social policies for years in 
Luxembourg.  We  could  make  profit,  in  the  future,  from  available  complementarities  between 
administrative  and  survey  data  and  create  an  operational  link,  for  example  through  statistical 
matching, under the requirement of data privacy. 
 
For the time being, our main objective is to participate in the preliminary cross-validation of the two 
datasets.     
 
Given the constraints inherent to the data, we target our analysis on Luxembourg residents only. We 
thereby exclude all non-resident cross-border workers despite the fact that they represent as much as 
37% of total employment
1 in 2003 (hence their importance regard ing the tax-benefit system), a 
level which is a particularity of Luxembourg.  While administrative data, extracted  on that basis 
from the Data Warehouse, contain information of the whole population of Luxembourg (449,000 
observations for residents in 2003), survey data, extracted from the PSELL3/EU-SILC household 
panel for 2004 (incomes from 2003), is a representative sample of around 3,600 private households 
(9,800  individuals)  living  in  Luxembourg  with  detailed  information  on  incomes,  household 
structure and other socio-economic dimensions. 
 
A common reference tool for the comparison of the monetary characteristics of the population is the 
“equivalised disposable income” of the household
2, which deeply depends on total earnings within 
the household and the tax-benefit system as a whole. This complex interplay of policies makes the 
evaluation of the indicator a rather demanding task. Fortunately, there are models dealing with taxes 
and social transfers that can help.  
 
We have chosen to work with the EUROMOD static microsimulation model
3 which lets us derive 
the equivalised disposable income of households through a nice implementation of the structure of 18 NOV 2008  Liégeois, Berger, Islam and Wagener  -  Version IJM  Page 3  
 
the population, the distribution of earnings and the tax-benefit system in Luxembourg (as well as 
done for most European countries).  
 
Another important advantage of such a simulation platform is that a reduced set of input variables 
has to be implemented, prior to any simulation, from raw data. These variables are precisely defined 
and then compose a nice synthetic basis (which is here adopted) for a comparison of alternative 
datasets. 
 
EUROMOD is to be used for the simulation and comparison of social policies, which is of main 
interest in the last step of our present analysis. Going ahead with the initial comparison of the 
datasets designed in order to fit the EUROMOD framework, we are considering the classic analysis 
of the outcome of a tax reform, both through administrative and survey data. Such a reform was 
implemented on individual and household income in Luxembourg in 2001 and 2002, including a 
reduction of the number of the tax brackets and a significant fall of the maximal marginal tax rate 
(from 46% in 2000 to 42% in 2001 and to 38% in 2002). In 2000, the taxes on individual and 
household income represented 7.2% of GDP in Luxembourg, one fourth of the total governmental 
receipts from taxes (see Table 1.1) and about one fifth of the total receipts, social contributions 
included. The burden was then cut down to 7.0 % of GDP in 2001 and 6.4% in 2002, before rising 
again, mainly because of fiscal drag.  
 
Table 1.1  Governmental receipts from 2001 to 2006 (in % of GDP) 
  Country  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Taxes on individual 
and household income 
LU  7.2  7.0  6.4  6.6  6.7  7.2  7.5 
Total receipts from 
taxes 
LU  28.5  28.4  28.1  27.2  26.4  27.0  25.5 
Total receipts from 
taxes and social 
contributions 
LU  38.6  39.4  39.0  38.1  37.2  37.6  35.4 
EU-15  40.7  39.9  39.4  39.4  39.3  39.7  40.3 
Source : Eurostat 
 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting up of the datasets and points out 
the difficulty to make them as comparable as possible ex ante for a more confident cross-validation 
ex post. We compare the datasets in section 3 and assess the effects of the 2001-2002 tax reform on 
the 2003 population
4 in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
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2.    SETTING UP THE DATASETS THROUGH THE EUROMOD INPUT FRAMEWORK 
 
We introduce the main characteristics of the datasets, their initial setting-up in conformity with the 
EUROMOD input framework, adaptations needed for making them as comparable as possible, and 
finally the implications of some methodological choices.  
 
2.1  Setting up initial data from the PSELL survey data 
 
Luxembourg, as partner of the EUROMOD and MICRESA projects, is a user of the EUROMOD 
model, up to now based on the Luxembourg household panel (PSELL
5). For this exercise we use 
the  version  3/2004  covering  income  reference  year  2003.  The  PSELL  3  data  are  used  in 
Luxembourg as a basis for the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
6 (EU-
SILC). This is our first source of data. It is targeting the resident population of Luxembourg 
(“international civil servants” included) through a sample of about 3,600 private households (nearly 
9,800  persons).  Institutional  households  (mainly  elderly  people  residing  in  institutions)  are  not 
covered by the survey. The unit of analysis is the “residence” household (living in the same house). 
The sample configuration relies on (i) estimations of the resident population as of 1
st of January 
2004 by the Luxembourg Central Service for Statistics and Economic Studies
7 (STATEC) and on 
(ii) the most recent Luxembourg population census (15
th of February 2001). The data collection 
method is the face-to-face interview.  
 
Information about  all kinds of gross earnings are collected through the survey, including labor 
income, investment and property income, social benefits in cash, private transfers, etc. 
 
2.2  Setting up initial data from the Social Security Data Warehouse 
 
Our second source of data for EUROMOD is the Social Security Data Warehouse recently built up 
by the IGSS
8 administration in Luxembourg for the year 2003. The main objective of the Data 
Warehouse is to compose a normalized and exhaustive basis for the generation of statistics serving 
diversified purposes (general reports, OECD, etc). The Data Warehouse is gathering all information 
from several operational files of Social Security and other administrations ( e.g.  the  National 
Population  Registry)  which  are  of  interest  for  social  protection  analysis  :  monthly  and  yearly 
information on affiliation to social security, social contributions and benefits like pensions or family 
allowances, etc. The basic unit is the individual. Administrative data, exhaustive in their universe of 
definition, are neither related to a sampling process nor to high non response rates which require 18 NOV 2008  Liégeois, Berger, Islam and Wagener  -  Version IJM  Page 5  
 
weighting and imputation on the survey data side. Yet, these are not free of errors. 
 
No information from the fiscal administration is made available for the building-up of the Data 
Warehouse. However, labor earnings are partially known from the IGSS administration as they are 
needed for the calculation of the social contributions paid either by the employer or the earner 
himself  when  self-employed  or  socially  insured  on  a  voluntary  basis.  Consequently,  three 
limitations are to be noticed in the data. First, as in Luxembourg wages “declared” to the social 
security are allowed to be truncated when greater than seven times the Minimum Social Wage
9, it 
may happen that labor earnings are truncated for high wages. Second, the earnings of the persons 
who pay social contributions on a voluntary basis are most probably far departing from the real 
state. Finally, farmers’ income cannot be properly determined either.  On top of those limitations, 
no information is available in the Data Warehouse for capital income and private transfers.   
 
Taking  the  relationships  that  can  be  observed  between  the  individuals  in  the  Data  Warehouse, 
“Families”  are  constructed  on  a  “fiscal  basis”.  “Residence”  households,  which  are  the  unit  of 
analysis in PSELL, cannot be identified through available administrative data
10. The households are 
therefore built up in another way as follows. First, spouses
11  are identified as a basis for the 
household. This means that unmarried co habitants do not appear as linked in the database  (they 
belong to different fiscal households), indeed in conformity with fiscal rules which are described in 
the appendix. Second, a link is created between the children (basically, either unmarried and more 
than 21 years old or older but still a student or disabled)  and their parents through the family 
benefits raised by the latter during the year
12.  
 
Only persons for whom positive earnings (either income or allowance) can be identified in the Data 
Warehouse are included into the EUROMOD input database. The voluntary insured or coinsured 
individuals are included as well. An implication is that “international civil servants” residing in 
Luxembourg may not appear in the EUROMOD input database (they usually neither contribute to, 
nor benefit from -in monetary terms-, the social security system in Luxembourg). Of course, in 
conformity  with  the PSELL  database, residents only  are eligible
13. A last remark concerns  the 
persons living in institutional households. Due to the fact that it is impossible to identify them in the 
Data Warehouse, they are included in the EUROMOD input database built up from the Data 
Warehouse, as opposed to the one built up from survey data. 
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2.3  Improving comparability of the EUROMOD input datasets 
 
Given  our  main  objective  (see  Introduction),  it  seems  important  to  dispose  of  identifiable 
dissimilarities between the initial datasets as regards their respective populations and the lack of 
precision in some important (income-related) variables. Table 2.1 summarizes the question and 
gives  an  insight  about  complementary  adaptations  which  are  needed  for  an  ex  ante  better 
comparability of the EUROMOD input datasets. We can see, for example, that capital income has 
to be dropped from the survey-based data because no information is available about such an income 
in the administrative-based data. Keeping capital income on one side only would bias our results 
and weaken comparability of outcomes.  
 
Individuals receiving an income from agriculture are dropped as well (both sides, for comparability 
reasons) because methodological limits imply for the administrative-based dataset an imperfect link 
only between the reality of earnings and the contents of the income variable on this side. In all 
cases, when individuals are dropped, all members of the household follow in order to avoid bias due 
to a change in the structure of the household, a bias that might be transferred downstream (see 
infra). 
 
While comparing monetary characteristics, the “equivalised disposable income” of households will 
play a crucial role. As it is well known, the equivalised disposable income is the ratio of total 
disposable income
14 to the equivalent weight of the household. Following the so -called “OECD-
modified scale”, we assign a value (weight) of 1 to the household head, of 0.5 to each additional 
adult member and of 0.3 to each child (less than 14 years old). The idea is to allow comparison (of 
well-being) between families whose compositions differ while taking into account the economies of 
scale a family of several persons is benefitting from compared to a single person. The equivalised 
disposable income (which is called from now on “equivalised income” for short) is evaluated at the 
household  level.  Each  member  of  the  household  is  then  attributed  this  (common)  value  of 
equivalised income.  
 
Most usually in the literature, the “residence” household does matter, rather than the “fiscal” one. 
Departing from this, we work with fiscal households, whatever survey-based or administrative-
based data. This induces two effects which may generate some discrepancies between our results 
and the results based on (as they usually are) residence households. 
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Action / Remarks 
Number of 






Some information about cross-
border workers available in 
administrative data, but not in 
survey data, hence initially dropped 
in the former,  
leading to 449,025 cases 




All comparisons and actions to be 
based on fiscal households 
Institutional 
households 












within the data 
(**) 
Administrative-based data : 
Drop cases (*) if a married partner 
announced despite absent from the 
data (***) 
Survey-based data : 
Drop cases (*) if a member of the 






Included and can 
be identified 
(but earnings not 
reliable) 
(**) 
Drop cases (*) in administrative-
based data if a member of the 
household voluntarily insured  





Variables set to “0”  







(but earnings not 
reliable) 
Drop cases (*) 
Number of 






Administrative-based data : 
7% cases dropped  
Survey-based data : 
5% cases dropped 
Source : CEPS/INSTEAD 
(*)   “Drop  cases”  should  be  understood  as  “Drop  all  fiscal  household’s  members”  if  the  condition 
fulfilled. Dropping individuals separately (hence partially depriving households from members) would 
bias computations of equivalised disposable income (see infra), at-risk-of-poverty rates and other 
computations that are based on (fiscal) households as a whole. 
(**)   This decision, despite needed, generates some (or is unsuccessful in removing all sources of) non-
comparability between datasets 
(***)  Which is most probably due to an “international civil servant” status (a proxy only) 
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First, the disparity in income is affected. Table 2.2 gives an illustration for a “residence” household 
composed of 2 unmarried parents and 2 dependent children. In the residence framework, the total 
income (3,910) is divided by the total equivalent weight (2.3) to determine the equivalised income 
of each member of the household (1,700). In the fiscal framework, the father, unmarried, is fiscally 
separated from his partner and the children. To the father’s  (fiscal) household is associated an 
equivalised income of 2,110
15 whereas the equivalised income attributed to the rest of the family is 
1,000
16. Splitting households (from residence to fiscal units) then generates some disparity, even if 
it seems difficult to conclude about income heterogeneity within the whole population. 
 
Table 2.2  Equivalised income and the unit of analysis 
Household ID  Individual characteristics  Equivalised income 




Residence  Fiscal 
Residence  Fiscal 




2,110  1  1  1,700  2,110 




1,800  0.5  1  1,700  1,000 
I  B  3  20 
Child 
(student) 
0  0.5  0.5  1,700  1,000 
I  B  4  13 
Child 
(student) 
0  0.3  0.3  1,700  1,000 
Source : CEPS/INSTEAD 
 
 
Second, the first moments of equivalised income (hence the poverty line, see infra) differ from the 
one evaluated on a residence household basis. From the illustration shown in Table 2.2, it can be 
seen  that  the  average  (resp.  median)  equivalised  income  is  1,700  (resp.  1,700)  if  residence 
households considered, 1,277.5 (resp. 1,000) when fiscal households. The outcome stems from the 
definition of equivalised income, even if it seems difficult, here again, to anticipate the impact of 
the splitting procedure
17 over the whole distribution of income.  
 
3.    COMPARING THE EUROMOD INPUT DATASETS AND A FEW IMPLICATIONS 
DOWNSTREAM 
 
The process of adaptation of variables and selection of the population, when needed, ends up in two 18 NOV 2008  Liégeois, Berger, Islam and Wagener  -  Version IJM  Page 9  
 
EUROMOD input  datasets  made as  comparable as  possible  ex ante  and which are now  cross-
validated at the household and individual levels. 
 
3.1  The household level 
 
Table 3.1 gives an insight into the comparison when the household is the unit of analysis. Survey-
based data allow us to work both on a residence and a fiscal household basis.  
 
As  can  be  seen  from  Table  3.1,  the  survey-based  EUROMOD  input  dataset  is  said  to  be 
“representative” of a population of 169,620
18 residence households which lead, through the splitting 
procedure, to 205,802 fiscal households.  
19% of residence households are composed of more than one fiscal household. 30% of residence 
households are composed of one person only; the difference with fiscal households (47% are of the 
“single”  type)  is  obviously  coming  from  the  inclusion  of  the  latter  units  within  residence 
households. More generally, Table 3.1 shows how close the survey-based data are, compared to 
administrative-based data, when fiscal households are considered, despite the ex ante difference in 
nature of the source data
19. 
 
3.2  Non-monetary characteristics at the individual level 
 
Tables  3.2  and  3.3  compare  the  EUROMOD  input  datasets  when  the  individual  is  the  unit  of 
analysis. 419,030 persons (resp. 418,861) are “represented” through the survey-based data (resp. 
administrative-based  data).  Once  again,  strong  similarities  can  be  observed  between  the  non-
monetary characteristics given in Table 3.2 for the two datasets. One important discrepancy that is 
not mentioned, nevertheless, is about time needed for simulations, which goes from a few minutes 
for survey-based data up to more than 5 hours when administrative-based data are used. 
 
3.3  Monetary characteristics at the individual level and downstream implications 
 
Concerning the income components (Table 3.3) a divergence appears at the “primary income
20” 
level, which is 7% lower (on average) in administrative-based data than in survey-based ones
21. 
This difference is mainly a discrepancy due to employment income (about 90% of primary income, 
out of capital income) for which the ratio survey/administrative is 1.09. 
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Table 3.1  Comparing EUROMOD datasets when unit of analysis is the HOUSEHOLD 












Raw data (i)  3,296  4,274 
212,646  Weighted count 
(i) 
169,620  205,802 
Number of fiscal 
households in the 
residence 
household 
















persons in the 
household 
1  30%  47%  50% 
2  28%  25%  24% 
3 or 4  33%  23%  21% 
5 or more  9%  5%  5% 
Number of 
workers (iii) in 
the household 
0  30%  34%  35% 
1  40%  48%  47% 
2 or more  29%   18%  17% 
Type of 
household 
Single (< 65)  19%  35%  37% 
Single (> 65)  11%  12%  14% 
Single with 
dependent(s) (iv) 
7%  6%  5% 
Couple – 0 
dependent 
24%  21%  20% 
Couple – 1-2 
dependent(s) 
30%  20%  20% 
Couple – 3 
dependents or 
more 
9%  5%  5% 
Source : CEPS/INSTEAD  (NB : Proportions rounded to the closest percentage point) 
(i)   Raw data : number of surveyed households - Weighted counts : households’ weights (from PSELL3/EU-
SILC survey) taken into account  
(ii)   All results below in % of total number of households (households’ weights taken into account) 
(iii)  Employer, self-employed or employee (from the employment status) 
(iv)  Dependent : neither head of household nor a partner in a couple 
Guide  to  reader  :  3,296  residence  households  have  their  characteristics  reported  from  the  2004 
PSELL3/EU-SILC in the EUROMOD survey-based dataset, “representing” 169,620 residence households 
within  the  population  ;  19%  of  the  residence  households  (household  weights  taken  into  account)  are 
composed of one person who is less than 65 years old ; 17% are composed of 2 fiscal households. 
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Table 3.2  Comparing EUROMOD datasets when the unit of analysis is the INDIVIDUAL : 
Non-monetary characteristics 





Number of persons 
Raw data (i)  8,657 




Female  50.7%  50.5% 
Male  49.3%  49.5% 
Age 
Age < 18  22%  22% 
18<= Age < 59  59%  59% 
Age >= 60  19%  20% 
Type of household 
Single (< 65)  17%  19% 
Single (> 65)  6%  7% 
Single with 
dependent(s) (ii) 
7%  6% 
Couple – 0 
dependent 
21%  21% 
Couple – 1-2 
dependent(s) 
35%  35% 
Couple – 3 
dependents or 
more 
14%  12% 
Number of workers (iii) 
in the household 
0  25%  26% 
1  45%  45% 
2 or more  30%  29% 
Source : CEPS/INSTEAD (NB : Proportions rounded to the closest percentage point) 
(i)  Raw data : number of surveyed individuals - Weighted counts : individual weights (from PSELL3/EU-
SILC survey) taken into account  
(ii)   Dependent : neither head of household nor a partner in a couple 
(iii)  Employer, self-employed or employee (from the employment status) 
 
 
The confidence interval shown in Table 3.3 for the primary income implies that the divergence 
cannot be statistically imputed, for a confidence level of 95%
22, to the sampling process on the 
survey-side. Actually, the setting up of the data can help a little in understanding differences. Table 
2.1 is mentioning, despite the adaptation process of the EUROMOD input datasets for improving 
their  comparability,  some  lack  of  similarity  regarding  the  institutional  households.  Moreover, 
individuals deceased or disappearing from the data records during the last year cannot be treated 
perfectly the same way in both datasets. Taking roughly into account those dissimilarities
23, it can 
be shown that the difference in primary income might be reduced and the results made statistically 
compatible given the sampling process
24. It is also worth mentioning some discrepancy regarding 18 NOV 2008  Liégeois, Berger, Islam and Wagener  -  Version IJM  Page 12  
 
income measurement. For example, survey-based data include in “employment” earnings sickness 
replacement wages when relating to very short periods.    
 
The gap in primary income is transferred downstream, throughout the tax-benefit system. Of course, 
the progressive nature of the tax system helps in reducing the differences after taxes. This is also 
illustrated  in  Table  3.3.  Thanks  to  EUROMOD  microsimulation,  social  security  contributions, 
family allowances, social assistance and taxes are determined and disposable as well as equivalised 
incomes  are  derived
25.  As  a  benchmark,  the  “without  tax  reform”  environment  is  chosen  (see 
section 4 infra).  
 
At  the  end  of  the  process,  mean  (resp.  median)  equivalised  income  as  evaluated  from  the 
administrative-based dataset differs by 1% (resp. 4%) only from its value derived from the survey-
based (fiscal household) framework. Table 3.3 also shows that a change in the unit of analysis, from 
the residence to the fiscal household, induces a drop of the mean equivalised income by 5%. The 
total  household  disposable  income  is  indeed  decreasing  (see  section  2.3  for  a  qualitative 
explanation) more, on average, than the equivalent weight (resp. 13% and 10%) while changing the 
reference unit. 
 
Regarding the distribution of equivalised income, it can be seen from Table 3.3 that measurements 
do not differ too much between the datasets. If the aversion to inequality is low (Atkinson index
26 
with a coefficient of 0.5) or when we pay more attention to the “middle” of the distribution (through 
the  Gini
27  coefficient  and  the  interquartile  ratio),  the  inequality  indices  derived  from  the 
administrative-based  data  are  statistically  compatible  or  close  to  be  compatible
28  with  those 
resulting from survey-based data. When the aversion to inequality becomes greater (Atkinson index 
with a coefficient of 2) or both “extremes” of the distribution of income matter (P90/P10 ratio), the 
measurements become fully compatible. Nevertheless, more discrepancies are observed when we 




Tables  3.4  and  3.5  give  more  details  about  the  distribution  of  income  (as  determined  through 
EUROMOD  microsimulation  in  a  without-tax-reform  environment  and  on  a  “fiscal  household” 
basis) and the at-risk-of-poverty rates, given different typologies and, within each of them, for all 
categories concerned. An “at-risk-of-poverty rate” is conventionally defined as the proportion of 
individuals whose equivalised income is below the so-called “poverty line” which is 60% of the 
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Table 3.3  Comparing EUROMOD datasets when the unit of analysis is the INDIVIDUAL : 
Monetary characteristics and implications downstream 
(*), 
in EUR / month (except Equivalent weight and Inequality coefficients) 
Characteristics  Categories 
Survey-based  
EUROMOD data  Administrative-
based 
EUROMOD data  Residence 
households  Fiscal households 
Primary income (i),  
out of capital income (ii)  
(on average) 
1,493 
[1,416 – 1,570] (iii)  1,384 
Capital income (ii) 
(on average)  78  Not available in 
source data 
Standard disposable income  
(iv), (vi) 
(on average) 
1,529  1,518 
Total household disposable income 
(v), (vi)  
(on average) 
4,395  3,811  3,720 
OECD equivalent weight 





Mean  2,276  2,158  2,131 
Median  2,076  1,980  1,898 
Poverty line (60% 
of the median)  1,246 
1,188 
[1,171 – 1,205] 
(iii) 
1,138 
Gini coefficient  Not computed 
0.243 
[0.236 – 0.249] 
(iii) 
0.248 
P75 / P25 ratio  Not computed 
1.727 




(inequality aversion coefficient : 0.5)  Not computed 
0.048 
[0.045 – 0.050] 
(iii) 
0.051 
P90 / P10 ratio  Not computed 
2.798 




(inequality aversion coefficient : 2.0)  Not computed 
0.227 
[0.203 – 0.252] 
(iii) 
0.223 
Source : CEPS/INSTEAD (and EUROMOD microsimulation) 
(*)  All amounts before/without the 2001-2002 tax reform in Luxembourg (see section 4 infra) 
(i)   Primary  income  (see  footnote  20)  =  Gross  earnings  all  sources  (out  of  public  pensions),  before 
Employee social contributions and Income taxation, and out of Social benefits 
(ii)   Capital income = Gross property income + Gross investment income 
(iii) All 95 %  STATA “bootstrap” confidence intervals (500 replications) 
(iv)  Standard  disposable  income  =  Primary  income  –  Employee  social  contributions  
–  Income  taxes  +  Social  benefits  in  cash  (Reminder  :  the  capital  income  is  here  excluded  from 
computations) 
(v)  Total  disposable  income  within  the  household,  attributed  to  each  member  in  conformity  with  the 
computation of the equivalised income  
(vi)  Evaluated through EUROMOD microsimulation 18 NOV 2008  Liégeois, Berger, Islam and Wagener  -  Version IJM  Page 14  
 
 
It is worth noticing that the usual basis for analysis of poverty is the residence household and not 
the  fiscal  one,  which  makes  a  difference  regarding  the  household  disposable  income,  the 
equivalised income of the members hence the poverty line and the at-risk-of poverty rates (see 
Table 3.3). Nevertheless, we are here mentioning indicators regarding the fiscal households. Indeed, 
we  are  constrained  by  the  administrative-based  data  where  no  information  is  available  about 
residence households. Fortunately, we can also remind our main objective which is the comparison 
of the datasets for cross-validation rather than a specific standard poverty analysis. 
 
The  at-risk-of-poverty  rates  are  higher,  on  average
30  as  well  as  for  most  categories
31,  when 
evaluated through the survey-based data
32 (Table 3.4). It can also be shown that, regarding the 
whole population, the intensity of poverty, measured by the “income gap ratio”
33, is higher through 
survey-based data. More generally, usual findings follow : younger people, singles either less-than-
65-years-old or with dependent(s)
34 and the members of households where nobody is working are 
more at risk of poverty than the other categories within the population, whatever the dataset under 
consideration. It can  be seen that those populations are more concentrated in the first deciles of 
income distributions than others. Singles with dependent(s) and the households with no worker also 
experience less equivalised income, on average, than the members of the respecti ve associated 
categories (Table 3.5). Nevertheless, no systematic link can be observed between the mean level of 
income within a category and its at-risk-of-poverty rate.  
 
A few striking discrepancies are to be noticed between the datasets, for example concerning the 
“singles with dependent(s)” who are marked twice more at risk of poverty in survey-based data. But 
we should be cautious about interpretation, given the sampling nature of the survey which might 
induce bias as far as a sub-group (7% of the population, see Table 3.5) only is concerned. The gap 
in poverty between men and women is also shown close to 0% under administrative-based data but 
not far from 1% when survey-based data are considered. 
 
It must be noticed again that, due to the fact that the calculation have been made on the “fiscal 
households” and not on “residence households”, it makes no sense to compare these figures with 
poverty rates published at the European and the national levels.  
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Table 3.4  At-risk-of-poverty rates and distribution of categorical populations over income deciles 
(based on equivalised income determined through “fiscal households” in a without-tax-reform environment – see section 4 infra) 
 
Source : CEPS/INSTEAD (and EUROMOD microsimulation) 
(*)  Income deciles as evaluated over the whole population (not the category only) ; the unit of analysis is the individual 
  Proportions rounded to the closest percentage point : the resulting total may differ from 100% 
Guide to reader : 13% of the elderly (more than 60 years old) belong to the third decile of the general population equivalised income distribution 
Total 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Administrative-based 7.4% 100% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Survey-based 9.6% 100% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Administrative-based 7.3% 100% 10% 11% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Survey-based 9.9% 100% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 11% 10% 10% 9% 9%
Administrative-based 7.5% 100% 10% 9% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Survey-based 9.2% 100% 10% 9% 10% 10% 10% 9% 10% 10% 11% 11%
Administrative-based 7.9% 100% 11% 10% 11% 10% 10% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10%
Survey-based 11.8% 100% 13% 12% 10% 8% 9% 10% 10% 8% 10% 9%
Administrative-based 8.8% 100% 12% 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 10% 11% 11% 12%
Survey-based 10.4% 100% 11% 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 11% 12% 12%
Administrative-based 2.6% 100% 3% 15% 11% 14% 14% 15% 12% 7% 6% 4%
Survey-based 4.2% 100% 4% 11% 13% 14% 14% 13% 12% 8% 5% 6%
Administrative-based 12.9% 100% 17% 11% 10% 8% 8% 8% 9% 11% 10% 8%
Survey-based 15.9% 100% 16% 9% 10% 8% 7% 8% 10% 11% 11% 10%
Administrative-based 3.3% 100% 3% 20% 8% 9% 13% 18% 14% 9% 4% 3%
Survey-based 5.7% 100% 6% 10% 13% 11% 15% 14% 16% 8% 5% 3%
Administrative-based 16.8% 100% 23% 15% 11% 9% 9% 8% 8% 7% 5% 6%
Survey-based 32.3% 100% 34% 14% 11% 10% 8% 3% 5% 6% 7% 2%
Administrative-based 2.6% 100% 4% 9% 10% 13% 11% 11% 10% 9% 10% 13%
Survey-based 3.9% 100% 4% 10% 11% 12% 12% 10% 8% 10% 7% 15%
Administrative-based 6.7% 100% 9% 6% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10% 11% 12% 13%
Survey-based 7.6% 100% 8% 7% 9% 9% 9% 11% 11% 12% 13% 11%
Administrative-based 6.7% 100% 9% 14% 13% 11% 10% 9% 9% 9% 9% 6%
Survey-based 4.4% 100% 7% 15% 10% 12% 10% 12% 10% 7% 10% 8%
Administrative-based 8.7% 100% 10% 17% 12% 13% 13% 13% 10% 6% 4% 2%
Survey-based 15.9% 100% 16% 13% 13% 13% 12% 11% 10% 6% 3% 3%
Administrative-based 8.6% 100% 13% 9% 10% 9% 10% 9% 10% 11% 10% 8%
Survey-based 11.3% 100% 13% 10% 11% 10% 11% 10% 9% 9% 10% 8%
Administrative-based 4.5% 100% 6% 5% 8% 8% 8% 8% 10% 12% 15% 20%
Survey-based 1.7% 100% 2% 7% 6% 8% 7% 10% 11% 14% 16% 18%
Number of 
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Table 3.5  Distribution of equivalised income  
(determined through “fiscal households” in a without-tax-reform environment – see section 4 infra) 
 
Source : CEPS/INSTEAD (and EUROMOD microsimulation) 
(*) Mean income for individuals belonging to the decile evaluated over the whole population (not the category only) ; the unit of analysis is the individual  
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Administrative-based 100% 2,131 996 1,244 1,418 1,611 1,802 1,994 2,210 2,508 2,967 4,557
Survey-based 100% 2,158 870 1,294 1,499 1,699 1,882 2,066 2,282 2,594 3,013 4,401
Administrative-based 51% 2,109 1,000 1,249 1,418 1,611 1,802 1,994 2,208 2,507 2,967 4,554
Survey-based 51% 2,117 880 1,292 1,502 1,693 1,883 2,065 2,286 2,592 3,007 4,369
Administrative-based 49% 2,152 991 1,237 1,417 1,610 1,802 1,993 2,212 2,509 2,966 4,560
Survey-based 49% 2,199 859 1,295 1,496 1,704 1,881 2,067 2,277 2,596 3,019 4,428
Administrative-based 22% 2,133 1,084 1,239 1,415 1,612 1,801 1,993 2,210 2,511 2,969 4,667
Survey-based 22% 2,068 936 1,285 1,497 1,693 1,874 2,069 2,279 2,616 2,982 4,304
Administrative-based 59% 2,189 964 1,234 1,416 1,611 1,802 1,995 2,213 2,511 2,972 4,485
Survey-based 59% 2,228 844 1,296 1,501 1,701 1,877 2,067 2,284 2,593 3,019 4,416
Administrative-based 20% 1,954 1,008 1,266 1,424 1,609 1,803 1,992 2,202 2,495 2,928 4,877
Survey-based 19% 2,044 835 1,298 1,497 1,700 1,898 2,061 2,279 2,573 3,052 4,479
Administrative-based 19% 1,960 846 1,227 1,414 1,609 1,803 1,997 2,214 2,507 2,969 4,358
Survey-based 17% 2,103 692 1,301 1,507 1,702 1,880 2,067 2,278 2,598 3,013 4,507
Administrative-based 7% 1,887 1,003 1,304 1,425 1,616 1,804 1,997 2,198 2,493 2,920 4,194
Survey-based 6% 1,959 768 1,297 1,494 1,696 1,895 2,059 2,270 2,549 3,033 3,958
Administrative-based 6% 1,838 1,060 1,233 1,410 1,607 1,800 1,992 2,210 2,503 2,948 5,095
Survey-based 7% 1,566 792 1,308 1,516 1,692 1,896 2,047 2,288 2,573 3,003 4,455
Administrative-based 21% 2,251 1,033 1,230 1,424 1,607 1,802 1,991 2,208 2,509 2,963 4,527
Survey-based 21% 2,292 859 1,302 1,501 1,701 1,896 2,060 2,288 2,573 3,074 4,403
Administrative-based 35% 2,301 1,076 1,242 1,419 1,614 1,802 1,993 2,212 2,511 2,972 4,609
Survey-based 35% 2,296 1,041 1,292 1,493 1,698 1,874 2,076 2,283 2,599 3,014 4,418
Administrative-based 12% 1,984 1,092 1,240 1,412 1,611 1,800 1,992 2,210 2,511 2,963 4,553
Survey-based 14% 2,079 1,145 1,273 1,491 1,698 1,862 2,057 2,279 2,642 2,952 4,240
Administrative-based 26% 1,743 868 1,253 1,421 1,608 1,802 1,992 2,202 2,492 2,917 3,952
Survey-based 25% 1,733 628 1,303 1,504 1,700 1,892 2,060 2,281 2,575 3,034 3,943
Administrative-based 45% 2,079 1,034 1,235 1,415 1,611 1,802 1,995 2,213 2,509 2,964 4,605
Survey-based 45% 2,098 1,020 1,284 1,501 1,691 1,880 2,065 2,277 2,597 3,008 4,426
Administrative-based 29% 2,553 1,064 1,243 1,418 1,614 1,803 1,993 2,213 2,515 2,981 4,585
Survey-based 30% 2,599 1,061 1,299 1,487 1,713 1,875 2,073 2,288 2,598 3,015 4,450
Number of 
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4.    A COMPARATIVE APPLICATION TO THE ANALYSIS OF A TAX REFORM 
 
In the previous sections, we have emphasized similarities and discrepancies observed between the 
survey-based and administrative-based datasets seen as raw data, even if redesigned in order to fit 
the EUROMOD input framework. We are now going a step further and considering the implication 
of an alternative use of the datasets for the classic analysis of a tax reform.  
 
Such a reform was implemented on individual and household income in Luxembourg in 2001 and 
2002. The characteristics of the reform are described in the appendix and we are here highlighting 
its main (rather common) outlines only : 
-  The  first  tax  bracket  is  enlarged,  which  means  that  the  minimum  income  before  tax  is 
increased, from 6,693 EUR in 2000 up to 9,750 EUR in 2002 
-  The number of tax brackets is reduced, from 18 down to 17 in 2002 and band widths are made 
uniform to 1,650 EUR in 2002 
-  The maximum tax rate significantly decreases, from 46% to 38% in 2002 
 
This section analyses the distributional effects of the reform on the 2003 population. All results are 
derived  from  both  the  administrative-based  and  survey-based  datasets.  We  first  develop  the 
methodological framework chosen for the analysis in order to make the comparison as accurate as 
possible. Then, we present an overall view on inequalities, with and without the tax reform, and on 
changes in disposable income by category of population. Finally, we concentrate more on the left-
hand side of the distribution through looking into the proportion and characteristics of non-tax 
payers and finally examining the at-risk-of-poverty rates.  
 
4.1  Methodological framework for analysis 
 
Given the 2001-2002 fiscal changes in Luxembourg, the initial idea is to compare the 2000 situation 
with the 2002 one, whatever the way for proceeding. Nevertheless, the changes over a 2-year period 
regarding the economy and the social field reflect several influences, not limited to the evolution of 
fiscal rules. During this period, the population (age, composition of households, etc) changes, the 
economy faces some inflation and hopefully economic growth (hence an impact on real earnings), 
the  distribution  of  primary  income  may  be  altered,  policies  other  than  the  fiscal  one  can  be 
amended, unemployment may not be stable, etc (Fuchs and Lietz, 2007, Immervoll et al., 2006). All 
these first-round effects can still be completed either through behavioral answers of the population 18 NOV 2008  Berger, Islam, Liégeois and Wagener  -  Version IJM  Page 18  
 
(e.g. labor supply), or through feedback effects from the economy as a whole (e.g. prices), or 
through sectorial budgetary constraints (e.g. individual or public accounts). 
 
We would like to strictly avoid the changes not directly resulting from the tax reform in itself. 
Moreover, our main objective remains the comparison of specific datasets. These are the reasons 
why we choose to concentrate on a  given year, as far as the economy and the social field are 
concerned, with a simple treatment of the tax-benefit environment. In the benchmark
35, the tax 
system is designed as before the 2001-2002 reform, conforming to the brief description made earlier 
(and completed in the appendix). The alternative is then simply to set up the tax system as on 2002, 
that means in its post-reform state. On the benefit side, no change is to be mentioned between the 
benchmark and the alternative. The year 2003 (rather than 2002) is chosen as a basis for analysis. 
This is simply due to a constraint on administrative data the first set of which was made available 
for the year 2003 only.  
 
Altogether, these options lead to the following story. We compare two situations, one where the 
Luxembourg population in 2003 faces the real tax-benefit system of 2003, the other one where the 
tax system of 2000 is applied to the same population, everything else (e.g. benefits) untouched. In 
other words, we ask what had happened for the population in 2003, had the 2000 tax system either 
been frozen, on one side, or be  replaced by the new 2003 tax system, on the other side. The 
hypothesis of an invariant tax system through time makes sense in Luxembourg where the tax rules 
are basically not changing between reforms (e.g. no adaptation relating to the consumption price 
index is made on an automatic basis), what was observed e.g. from 2002 up to the beginning of 
2008. The benefit side, on the contrary, is following in Luxembourg a more dynamic track, which 
makes quite natural our hypothesis of a benefit system designed in 2003 as it really was, whatever 
the tax system. 
 
Given  our  framework  for  analysis,  we  assess  the  distributional  effects  of  the  tax  reform  on 
individual income through the tax-benefit static microsimulation model EUROMOD. EUROMOD 
is a flexible tool that enables research on the first-round effects
36 of policy reforms that have an 
impact on earnings (mainly through social contributions, taxes and cash benefits), hence on poverty 
and inequality (Sutherland, 2001). Microsimulation models rely on micro -data representative of a 
population (households and individuals) and designed so that we can hold most influences constant 
(e.g.  the  benefit  system,  including  non-take-up  behavior,  and  demographic  characteristics)  and 
focus on the effect of one change at a time (e.g. the tax system and/or the dataset). 
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4.2  An overall view on the redistributional effects and inequalities 
 
The Gini coefficient, the Atkinson inequality indices
37 and the percentile ratios give us an overall 
view of inequality in the distribution of equivalised income. The values of these coefficients are 
reported in  Table 4.1 for administrative-based and survey-based data, with and without the tax 
reform.  
 
Table 4.1  Redistributional effects of the tax reform and changes in inequality (*) 
 









Gini if “no tax” (i) 
(1) 
0.308  0.318 
Gini “with tax” (ii) 
(2) 
0.243  0.256  0.248  0.263 
G 
(3) = (1) – (2) = (4) – (5) 
0.066  0.052  0.070  0.055 
Reynolds-Smolensky index of 
vertical equity 
 
0.067  0.053  0.071  0.056 
Re-ranking index of  
horizontal inequity  
(5) 
0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000 
Kakwani index of  
tax progressivity  
(6) 
0.332  0.400  0.351  0.420 
Rate  (iii) 
(7) 
0.168  0.116  0.169  0.117 
P75 / P25  1.727  1.807  1.760  1.845 
Atkinson index  
(inequality aversion = 0.5) 
0.048  0.053  0.051  0.057 
P90 / P10  2.798  3.003  2.809  3.004 
Atkinson index 
(inequality aversion = 2) 
0.227  0.246  0.223  0.243 
Source : CEPS/INSTEAD (and EUROMOD microsimulation) 
(*)  Based on the distribution of individual equivalised income – When applying formula, rounding effects 
sometimes 
(i)  Based on the individual equivalised income when all taxes dropped = household total disposable 
income if no tax /equivalent weight of the household (see section 2.3 supra) 
(ii)  Based on the individual equivalised income when all taxes included (normal case) = household total 
disposable income /equivalent weight of the household (see section 2.3 supra) 
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Table 4.1 clearly shows that the values of the inequality coefficients are increased due to the reform 
meaning that the inequalities in the distribution of equivalised income are deepened. Moreover, the 
changes in the indices seem quite comparable regarding the data sources.  
 
The impact of the tax system is explored further in Table 4.1. For example, the Gini index if all 
taxes were dropped would be 0.308 through survey-based data. It becomes 0.243 when the tax 
system (as before the reform) is implemented. This drop in the inequality coefficient is mainly due 
to  vertical  redistribution
38  of  the  tax  system  (Reynolds-Smolensky  index).  The  horizontal 
redistribution appears to be negligible
39.  
 
The  Reynolds-Smolensky  index  of  vertical  redistribution  can  still  be  decomposed  into 
“progressivity” (Kakwani index) and “magnitude” (a coefficient depending on the average rate of 
taxation), both factors playing a positive role on the vertical redistribution. This decomposition 
helps  in  understanding  what  is  at  stake  in  the  tax  reform.  Clearly,  the  reduction  in  vertical 
redistribution due to the reform (0.067 down to 0.053, regarding the survey-based data) results from 
a drop in the rate of taxation (from 16.8% down to 11.6%) and not from the progressivity which is 
increased (from 0.332 to 0.400) as measured by the Kakwani index
40.  
 
4.3  Changes in equivalised income 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the average change in individual equivalised income for different income groups 
(deciles) due to the tax reform. In all results below, the benchmark is the without-tax-reform value 
of the equivalised income shown in Table 3.5. The members of the deciles are frozen and their 
change  in  income  is  examined
41. Given the characteristics of the 2001 -2002 tax reform, each 
Luxembourg resident is a “gainer” (which means either null or positive impact on the equivalised 
income). On the whole, the reform increases equivalised income by 6.2%. This positive change in 
equivalised income is observed for all deciles and the higher the income the higher the gain. This 
confirms that the new tax structure increases the inequality of income distribution (see section 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2 also shows the average change in individual equivalised income for different categories of 
population and each decile of the income distribution. The overall changes are clearly positive for 
all categories
42. Moreover, whatever the category and the dataset, the higher the income the higher 
the relative gain
43. More specifically, when all deciles are included (last column in  Table 4.2), 
singles without a dependent gain relatively more than couples, especially when dependent(s) are 
associated to the latter. Younger people (age less than 18) benefit less from the reform than the 18 NOV 2008  Berger, Islam, Liégeois and Wagener  -  Version IJM  Page 21  
 
others, whatever the decile, which is consistent with the previous result concerning the households 
with dependent(s). The overall increase of equivalised income for the intermediate age category 
(18<=age<60) is most often slightly less than the one observed for the elderly. Finally, it can be 
observed that the households with one worker or more gain less from the reform, on average and 
within each decile, than the members of the no-worker category. Concerning gender, in general, 
only small differences are observed between men and women due to the tax reform. 
 
Figure 4.1  Average percentage change in equivalised income  
due to the tax reform, by decile (*) 
 
Source: CEPS/INSTEAD (and EUROMOD microsimulation) 
(*)   Decile groups based on equivalised income without tax reform.  
  The benchmark is the without-tax-reform value of the equivalised income shown in Table 3.5 
 
 
4.4  Proportions and characteristics of non-tax payers 
 
Table 4.3 shows that 14% of the fiscal households would not have paid any income tax in 2003, had 
no tax reform been implemented. Thanks to the tax reform, 20% of them pay no tax in 2003, what 
maybe also contributes to the higher progressivity of the tax system due to the reform (see supra). 
When individuals are chosen as the unit of analysis, the proportion of non tax payers is increasing 
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Table 4.2  Average change (in %) of equivalised income for different categories of population, by decile (*) 
 
Source: CEPS/INSTEAD (and EUROMOD microsimulation) 
(*)   Decile groups of individuals are based on equivalised income without tax reform (the benchmark is 
the without-tax-reform picture of the equivalised income shown in Table 3.5). 
 
Table 4.4 is telling more about the characteristics of non-tax payers. Younger people, singles (either 
when more-than-65-years-old or with dependents) and the members of households where nobody or 
one person only is working are more often exempt from taxes on income. The proportion of tax 




Administrative-based data 2.8 3.4 4.3 5.5 6.4 7.2 7.8 8.4 8.9 10.3 7.2
Survey-based data 2.0 3.8 4.8 5.9 6.5 7.5 7.4 8.5 8.9 10.6 7.6
Administrative-based data 0.0 0.0 1.6 5.4 7.4 8.7 9.2 9.7 10.0 11.8 7.0
Survey-based data 0.0 0.0 3.1 6.2 7.6 9.0 9.7 10.3 8.7 12.3 7.7
Administrative-based data 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.9 4.0 5.5 6.7 7.6 8.9 11.9 5.1
Survey-based data 0.2 0.7 1.5 3.6 6.2 6.3 8.0 7.5 10.3 11.6 4.8
Administrative-based data 1.1 3.1 4.1 4.9 5.5 6.1 6.5 6.8 7.7 9.3 6.7
Survey-based data 1.6 3.1 4.1 5.0 5.8 6.2 6.8 7.4 7.8 9.1 6.8
Administrative-based data 0.2 0.5 1.3 2.3 3.5 4.6 5.6 6.5 7.5 9.5 5.9
Survey-based data 0.3 0.8 1.5 3.4 3.7 4.5 5.1 6.4 7.5 9.1 5.7
Administrative-based data 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.3 2.6 4.0 5.2 6.3 7.2 9.7 4.4
Survey-based data 0.2 0.2 0.3 2.4 3.5 4.8 5.0 6.9 7.2 8.7 4.7
Age
Administrative-based data 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5 2.9 4.2 5.4 6.4 7.4 9.7 5.2
Survey-based data 0.1 0.3 0.7 2.2 3.7 4.3 4.9 6.4 7.3 8.9 4.8
Administrative-based data 1.3 1.8 2.4 3.4 4.4 5.4 6.3 7.1 7.8 9.5 6.3
Survey-based data 1.0 1.7 2.8 4.1 4.8 5.5 6.1 7.3 8.1 9.4 6.4
Administrative-based data 1.1 1.8 3.8 5.3 6.5 7.6 8.0 8.5 8.9 10.8 6.8
Survey-based data 1.0 2.8 4.1 5.8 6.6 7.7 8.3 8.6 8.6 10.4 7.1
Number of workers in the household
Administrative-based data 1.7 2.0 3.6 5.1 6.3 7.3 7.8 8.3 8.7 9.8 6.0
Survey-based data 1.0 2.5 4.2 5.7 6.6 7.7 8.0 8.9 8.7 10.4 6.4
Administrative-based data 0.9 1.2 2.2 3.3 4.6 5.8 6.7 7.6 8.3 10.3 6.2
Survey-based data 0.6 1.3 2.4 4.1 5.2 5.7 6.6 7.8 8.5 10.0 6.2
Administrative-based data 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.5 2.6 3.9 5.1 6.1 7.2 9.3 6.2
Survey-based data 0.9 0.6 0.6 2.4 2.7 4.2 4.7 6.2 7.3 8.9 6.1
Gender
Administrative-based data 0.8 1.2 2.1 3.5 4.8 6.0 6.6 7.2 7.9 9.7 6.1
Survey-based data 0.8 1.4 2.4 4.1 5.2 5.9 6.5 7.3 8.0 9.4 6.1
Administrative-based data 1.1 1.7 2.4 3.5 4.5 5.6 6.4 7.1 7.8 9.7 6.2
Survey-based data 0.7 1.7 2.9 4.3 5.0 5.5 6.1 7.3 7.9 9.5 6.3
Administrative-based data 0.9 1.4 2.3 3.5 4.7 5.8 6.5 7.2 7.9 9.8
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Table 4.3  Proportions of households and individuals paying taxes with or without the tax reform 
 
Source : CEPS/INSTEAD (and EUROMOD microsimulation) 
 [i]  Weighted counts : for survey-based data, households’ and individuals’ weights (differing from 1) 
are taken into account. 
 
It is to be noticed that a higher at-risk-of-poverty rate does not systematically imply a significantly 
lower proportion of tax payers within the category (see Table 3.4). For example, less-than-65-years-
old singles are more often taxed on their income than couples with 1 or more dependents, despite a 
higher at-risk-of-poverty rate for the former. All these effects partially result from both the overall 
distribution of income
44 and the particularities of the Luxembourg tax-benefit system
45. We can also 
see from Table 4.4 that, most often, the lower the proportion of tax payers within a category with no 
reform, the stronger the proportional drop with the reform implemented.   
 
4.5  Impact on the at-risk-of-poverty rates 
 
In order to see the effect of the tax reform on the poorest, we calculate changes of the at-risk-of-
poverty rates due to the tax reform. At-risk-of-poverty rates are shown in Table 3.4 (see section 3.3) 
for the “without-tax-reform” environment, which is our benchmark. Table 4.5 presents changes of 
the rates when the tax reform is implemented.  
 
Thanks to the reform, equivalised income is increased for all individuals, which might let part of 
them get out of poverty. Nevertheless, the poverty line (60% of the median equivalised income) is 
also rising
46, which interferes with the previous effect.  Table 4.5 presents, on one side, changes of 
the at-risk-of-poverty rates, due to the tax reform, when the poverty line is frozen on its former 
state
47 (60% of the without-tax-reform median equivalised income). The “new-poverty-line” total 








205,802 212,646 419,030 418,861
No tax reform 14.2% 14.0% 16.0% 16.4%
Tax reform 20.4% 20.0% 23.6% 23.8%
No tax reform 85.8% 86.0% 84.0% 83.6%
Tax reform 79.6% 80.0% 76.4% 76.2%
Fiscal households Individuals Unit of analysis
Data
Pay taxes
Number of units 
(weighted count [i])
Do not pay 
taxes18 NOV 2008  Berger, Islam, Liégeois and Wagener  -  Version IJM  Page 24  
 
Table 4.4  Proportions of individuals paying taxes, given their characteristics, with or without the tax reform 
 
Source : CEPS/INSTEAD (and EUROMOD microsimulation) 
Guide to reader : 72% of the less than 18-years-old individuals are paying taxes in the no-tax-
reform environment (survey-based data). 84% of them only are still paying taxes if the tax reform is 
implemented, which implies that 61% of the less than 18-years-old individuals are taxed under tax 
reform. 
 
We can first observe from Table 4.5 that the change of the at-risk-of-poverty rate, when the poverty 
line is frozen on its initial state, is negative. On the contrary, the total change is positive (the risk of 
poverty is increased). The former result is of course that expected as all individuals are gaining 
(equivalent) income through the tax reform. The latter result can be explained by the vertically 
inequitable nature of the tax reform (see Figure 4.1 and section 4.2), which induces the shift-in-
poverty-line effect overcoming the gain-in-income one.  
 




when NO tax 
reform" 
( III, 




= II * III )
Administrative-based 100% 16.4% 83.6% 91.1% 76.2%
Survey-based 100% 16.0% 84.0% 91.0% 76.4%
Administrative-based 51% 18% 82% 90% 74%
Survey-based 51% 17% 83% 91% 75%
Administrative-based 49% 15% 85% 92% 79%
Survey-based 49% 15% 85% 91% 78%
Administrative-based 22% 29% 71% 85% 61%
Survey-based 22% 28% 72% 84% 61%
Administrative-based 59% 14% 86% 92% 79%
Survey-based 59% 14% 86% 92% 79%
Administrative-based 20% 11% 89% 94% 85%
Survey-based 19% 8% 92% 94% 86%
Administrative-based 19% 8% 92% 98% 90%
Survey-based 17% 11% 89% 98% 87%
Administrative-based 7% 28% 72% 86% 62%
Survey-based 6% 20% 80% 84% 67%
Administrative-based 6% 53% 47% 77% 36%
Survey-based 7% 53% 47% 75% 36%
Administrative-based 21% 2% 98% 95% 93%
Survey-based 21% 3% 97% 95% 92%
Administrative-based 35% 15% 85% 89% 75%
Survey-based 35% 13% 87% 88% 76%
Administrative-based 12% 32% 68% 84% 57%
Survey-based 14% 26% 74% 89% 66%
Administrative-based 26% 16% 84% 93% 78%
Survey-based 25% 19% 81% 92% 74%
Administrative-based 45% 21% 79% 89% 71%
Survey-based 45% 21% 79% 89% 70%
Administrative-based 29% 10% 90% 92% 83%
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Second, the total effect appears to be stronger for singles with dependents, couples with dependents, 
households with workers and younger individuals.  
 
Table 4.5  Changes in at-risk-of-poverty rate due to the tax reform (*) 
 
Source : CEPS/INSTEAD (and EUROMOD microsimulation) 
(*)   Changes as compared to the without-tax-reform at-risk-of-poverty rates shown in Table 3.4 
(**) 60% of the former (without-tax-reform) median equivalised income 
(**) 60% of the new (with-tax-reform) median equivalised income 
 
Finally,  regarding  the  comparison  between  administrative-based  and  survey-based  simulations, 
important differences can be observed, both on the qualitative side (ranking of gainers or losers) and 
on the quantitative side (see for example the total effect for singles with dependents and couples 
with three dependents or more).  
 
It can also be shown that the income gap ratio is reduced thanks to the reform : from 28% (resp. 
Characteristics and 
categories 













All  -0.3%  3.3%  -0.7%  3.1% 
Type of household         
Single (<65)  -1.1%  3.3%  -1.9%  1.0% 
Single (>=65)  -0.0%  0.3%  -0.0%  1.4% 
Single with 
dependent(s)  -0.1%  10.0%  -0.0%  5.6% 
Couple - 0 dependent  -0.2%  1.2%  -1.3%  0.4% 
Couple - 1-2 
dependent(s)  -0.1%  3.3%  -0.2%  3.2% 
Couple - 3 dependents 
or more  -0.1%  5.0%  -0.0%  9.3% 
Number of workers in 
the household         
No worker  -0.4%  1.5%  -0.5%  1.2% 
1 worker  -0.5%  4.9%  -1.0%  4.4% 
2 workers or more  -0.0%  2.3%  -0.2%  2.8% 
Age       
Age<18  -0.0%  5.4%  0.0%  6.4% 
18<=Age<59  -0.5%  3.5%  -1.0%  2.7% 
60<=Age  -0.1%  0.3%  -0.5%  0.6% 
Gender         
Female  -0.2%  3.3%  -0.7%  3.0% 
Male  -0.4%  3.3%  -0.6%  3.3% 
 18 NOV 2008  Berger, Islam, Liégeois and Wagener  -  Version IJM  Page 26  
 
18%) down to 24% (resp. 15%) through survey-based (resp. administrative-based) data. 
 
5.    CONCLUSIONS 
 
We  initiate,  through  the  EUROMOD  microsimulation  framework,  the  cross-validation  of 
administrative  data  derived  from  the  recently  implemented  Luxembourg  Social  Security  Data 
Warehouse, on the one side, and of the PSELL3/EU-SILC survey data, on the other side. 
 
We choose to work on the 2003 population in Luxembourg in  all cases. As a benchmark, the 
“without 2001-2002 Luxembourg tax reform” environment is chosen. 
 
Administrative data have some obvious limitations compared to survey data, because in general 
administrative  data  record  only  information  needed  for  administrative  purposes  like  collecting 
social contributions or paying social benefits, whereas the questionnaires for survey data may be 
designed  specifically  for  defined  research  purposes,  including  a  need  for  standardization  and 
comparability between countries
48. On the other hand, the kind of data provided by the Luxembourg 
Social Security  Data Warehouse have also some important advantages over survey data, like 
completeness
49, timeliness, availability of time series of data of different granularity, like yearly or 
monthly data
50. Moreover, administrative data include some information not available in survey 
data, e.g. in relation with health and long term care, cross-border workers (37% of the employment 
in 2003, what is essential regarding the tax-benefit system in Luxembourg), etc.  
 
Before  comparing  the  datasets  as  set  up  through  the  EUROMOD  input  framework,  it  seems 
important to dispose of dissimilarities that we can control for, regarding the target populations and 
the lack of precision in some important (income-related) variables. We have then to drop about 6% 
of the initial population in both datasets and adapt variables like capital income-related ones which 
are missing in the administrative-based dataset.  
 
An important implication is also to adopt the fiscal household as the unit of analysis, rather than the 
more usual residence household. This may play a role concerning the comparison of outcomes to 
other studies. The fiscal household being included into residence units, this leads to a distribution of 
equivalised income which departs from usual ones, with lower values for both means (10% less 
when fiscal households, if the benchmark) and medians (-5%). The at-risk-of-poverty rate and the 
gain or loss for the different categories of population are also affected.  
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Regarding several non-monetary characteristics, like the age classes and the types of households, 
the two EUROMOD input datasets appear to be satisfactorily similar. For monetary characteristics a 
first discordance is observed, mainly stemming from a gap in primary income which is, on average, 
7% lower in administrative-based data, an observation to be further explored. The difference in 
primary income implies downstream effects on equivalised income. 
 
Under the benchmark environment, the Gini coefficient and other inequality indices most often 
show a similar distribution  of equivalised income in  both  datasets.  Nevertheless,  regarding the 
leftist part of the distribution, the at-risk-of-poverty rates are higher through survey-based data, for 
all categories under study
51. Whatever the dataset under consideration, usually more at -risk-of-
poverty categories are shown up, like “singles with dependent(s)” and the members of households 
where nobody is working. Nevertheless, next to the qualitative comparison of outcomes, a few 
striking discrepancies appear, for example for the “singles with dependent(s)” who are marked 
twice more at risk of poverty through survey-based data in the without-tax-reform environment. 
 
It is shown that the 2001-2002 tax reform in Luxembourg results, for the resident population of 
2003,  in  a  rise  of  mean  equivalised  income  by  6%.  More  specifically,  the  elderly  and  singles 
without  dependent(s)  seem  to  experience  better  gains,  on  average,  than  other  categories  in  the 
corresponding typology. The higher the income, the higher the relative gains, whatever the category 
under consideration. The average gain for the highest decile of the population is about 9%, to be 
compared with less than 1% for the lowest decile, whatever the dataset. The Gini coefficient, higher 
with the reform, follows. This increase in inequality due to the reform is shown to result from a 
magnitude effect, i.e. the drop in the average rate of taxation, and not from the progressivity which 
is augmented, indeed. The at-risk-of-poverty rates of the different categories are increasing. But 
some, like singles with dependents and couples with three dependents or more are experiencing a 
rise  which  may  considerably  differ  in  intensity  between  administrative-based  and  survey-based 
data. 
 
On the whole, we can conclude at a satisfactory “proximity” (e.g. a statistical compatibility as 
assessed through confidence intervals) between the administrative-based and survey-based data, 
whether as input data for EUROMOD or as far as the effects of the 2001-2002 tax reform are 
concerned. Nevertheless, this robustness in the results regarding the source data is less observed 
when some monetary characteristics and the at-risk-of-poverty rates (whatever absolute levels or 
changes due to the tax reform) are considered. Even if the change of the average at-risk-of-poverty 
rate is similar with the two datasets, outcomes for specific categories may strongly differ
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Of course, this promising cross-validation outcome lies on the treatment we have chosen to impose 
to the initial datasets for making them targeting closer populations and getting rid of the effect of 
some income-related missing or unevenly biased variables.  
 
The next step might be to further explore these questions, especially on the administrative side or 
regarding  the  income  measurement,  in  order  to  make  those  methodology-based  arrangements 
essentially  no  longer  necessary.  An  important  extension  concerning  administrative  data  in 
Luxembourg would also be to properly deal with (postal) addresses, e.g. in order to make residence 
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APPENDIX :   THE TAX SYSTEM IN LUXEMBOURG AND THE 2001-2002 REFORM 
 
In this appendix, we describe the main characteristics of the tax system in Luxembourg and the 
modalities of the 2001-2002 reform. We focus on elements relevant to the present analysis only.  
 
A.1  The tax system in Luxembourg 
 
In Luxembourg, the tax unit is the “family” which might not include all members of a “residence 
household”
53. To belong to the same family, you must either be (official) spouse or a dependent 
child. Two cohabiting but non-spouse persons are then members of separate tax units. A “child” 
belongs to his/her parents’ tax unit if unmarried and less than 21 years old. As soon as married, a 
son/daughter enters his/her own tax unit. The same prevails if a person is older than 21 years and is 
neither a student any longer nor a disabled person. Of course, the set of rules includes many other 
aspects, related to the questions of “earnings” of dependent children, children living part-time only 
with their parents, status changing during the civil year, spouses separating/being divorced, etc. 
These questions, although essential to the system as a whole, are not discussed here because they 
are not necessary for a clear understanding of the present analysis. 
 
The tax system on income being progressive, it is important to know how the tax basis is defined. 
The taxable income is firstly involving the yearly gross earnings of all the members of the family 
(as  defined  earlier)  :  wages,  business  profits,  income  from  farming  and  forestry/self-
employment/pensions, investment and property incomes, etc. Social contributions and several tax 
allowances (e.g. for travel expenses or if a lone parent) are then deducted from gross amounts to 
define the adjusted taxable income. The adjusted taxable income is rounded
54 before applying the 
tax schedule (brackets and marginal rates) which is described in Table A.1 for the years 2000 up to 
2003. This tax schedule is used depending on the tax class the tax payer belongs to :  class 1, class 
1a or class 2. The tax class is defined given both family and individual characteristics of the tax 
payer, as shown in Table A.2. 
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Table A.1   Income tax schedule from 2000 to 2003 (tax brackets in EUR) 
 
Source : Fiscal administration and CEPS/INSTEAD (*) 
(*) Limits of bands rounded to nearest unity in 2001 and 2002 (originally in LUF : EUR becomes legal 
tender on 1
st of January 2002 only) 
Guide to reader : In 2002, an adjusted taxable income of 12,000 EUR is taxed  
0 % + 8% * (11,400 – 9,750) + 10% * (12,000 – 11,400) = 192 EUR (rounding error included). 
 
Tax payers belonging to “class 1” (e.g. a single person) are taxed directly following the schedule 
shown in Table A.1. For “class 2” tax payers (e.g. a married couple), the adjusted taxable income is 
initially halved, then the tax liability is first calculated as for single (“class 1”) persons and finally it 
is multiplied by two
55.  For “class 1a” tax payers (e.g. a lone parent with children), the story does 
appear to be more complex. The adjusted tax income is reduced by a part (fixed to 25% in 2000) of 
its  complement  to  a  given  basis  (fixed  to  40,159  EUR
56  in 2000) and, then, the tax liability 
calculated as for “class 1” tax payers

















1 6,693 0% 9,668 0% 9,750 0% 9,750 0%
2 8,775 6% 11,378 14% 11,400 8% 11,400 8%
3 10,486 16% 13,089 16% 13,050 10% 13,050 10%
4 12,196 18% 14,799 18% 14,700 12% 14,700 12%
5 13,907 20% 16,510 20% 16,350 14% 16,350 14%
6 15,617 22% 18,220 22% 18,000 16% 18,000 16%
7 17,328 24% 19,931 24% 19,650 18% 19,650 18%
8 19,038 26% 21,641 26% 21,300 20% 21,300 20%
9 20,749 28% 23,352 28% 22,950 22% 22,950 22%
10 22,459 30% 25,062 30% 24,600 24% 24,600 24%
11 24,170 32% 26,773 32% 26,250 26% 26,250 26%
12 25,880 34% 28,483 34% 27,900 28% 27,900 28%
13 27,591 36% 30,193 36% 29,550 30% 29,550 30%
14 29,301 38% 31,904 38% 31,200 32% 31,200 32%
15 31,011 40% 33,614 40% 32,850 34% 32,850 34%
16 32,722 42% > 33,614 42% 34,500 36% 34,500 36%
17 65,444 44% > 34,500 38% > 34,500 38%
18 > 65,444 46%
2000 2001 2002 2003
B
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maximum possible value (46% in 2000, see Table A.1)
58. Up to the year 2000, an additional rule is 
applied. The tax liability resulting from the previous calculation is reduced, when needed, insofar 
the “net” income (adjusted taxable income – tax liability) reaches a minimum threshold fixed to 
8,924 EUR
59 for “class 1” tax payers, 15,865 EUR
60 for the others classes
61. Finally, several tax 
credits (e.g. for dependent children) can still be deduced from the liability just evaluated, and an 
additional tax is imposed as a contribution to the unemployment fund. 
 
Table A.2  Tax classes and tax payer characteristics 
Class  Characteristics (*) 
1 
Non-married single without dependent children and less (<) than 65 years old 
Separated  or  divorced  since  at  least  3  years  (>=)  without  dependent  children  
and less than 65 years old 
1a 
Non-married single with dependent children 
Separated or divorced since less than 3 years with dependent children 
Non-married single more than 64 years old 
Widowed since more than 3 years 
2 
Married people 
Separated, divorced or widowed for less than 3 years 
Source : Fiscal administration (selection of criteria from CEPS/INSTEAD) 
(*) All characteristics (most often) as observed on 1
st of January of the fiscal (civil) year 
 
A.2  The 2001-2002 tax reform 
 
We now describe the characteristics of the 2001 and 2002 tax reform (one of our concerns in the 
present paper), which is implemented in two steps. Having a look at Table A.1 : 
-  The  first  tax  bracket  is  enlarged,  which  means  that  the  minimum  income  before  tax  is 
increased, from 6,693 EUR in 2000 up to 9,750 EUR in 2002 
-  The number of tax brackets is reduced, from 18 down to 17 in 2002 and band widths are made 
uniform to 1,650 EUR in 2002 
-  The maximum tax rate significantly decreases, from 46% to 38% in 2002 
 
Additionally, for “class 1a” tax payers, the basis for complement calculation (see supra) is fixed to 
38,671 EUR
62 in 2001 (40,159 EUR in 2000) and 39,000 EUR in 2002. The proportional part for 
reduction jumps from 25% in 2000 to 50% in 2001 and 2002
63. These computations are still to be 
made insofar as the marginal tax rate does not exceed its maximum possible value (46% in 2000, 
42% in 2001, 38% in 2002). Finally, the rules linked to the threshold for the “net” income resulting 
from the tax liability, henceforth useless, are dropped. It must also be noticed that the 2001-2002 
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Figure A.1  Impact of the 2001-2002 tax reform  
on the average rate of tax on income, given the tax class 
 
Source : CEPS/INSTEAD 
 
Figure A.1 shows how taxes are changing through the reform, given the adjusted taxable income 
and the tax class to be considered. The gain for tax payers is rather high, about a 7 % drop in the 
average tax rate for all classes when an adjusted taxable income of 50,000 EUR / year (idem for 




1   Source  :  STATEC  -  National  statistical  institute  of  Luxembourg  (through 
http://www.statistiques.public.lu). 
2   For a detailed presentation of social indicators, see Atkinson et al. (2002) and Marlier et al. (2006). 
3   http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/  
4   For a comparison between outcomes from interview and register data, see also  e.g. Nordberg (2003) and 
Nordberg and Pentillä (2001), for Finland. 
5   “Panel Socio-Economique Liewen zu Lëtzebuerg” (see http://www.ceps.lu/).  
6   EU-SILC is an instrument aiming at collecting timely and comparable cross -sectional and longitudinal 
multidimensional  microdata  on  income,  poverty,  social  exclusion  and  living  conditions  (see 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/). 
7   See http://www.statec.public.lu 
8   Inspection Générale de la Sécurité Sociale (see http://www.mss.public.lu/). 
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10  A track for overcoming the problem would be to deal with postal addresses, after improvement in their 
normalization. 
11  Either married all along the year, or married during the (civil) year, or divorced during the year. 
12  If  unmarried  parents,  the  child  goes  to  his  mother’s  household,  unless  an  explicit  demand  from  the 
mother to link the child with his father concerning the family benefits. If born during the year, or when 
family benefits come to an end during the (civil) year, a child is still linked to his parents’ household. 
13  Information for non-residents is partially available in the Data Warehouse. 
14  Total disposable income = (earnings  – social contributions – taxes + social benefits) summed up over all 
members of the household. 
15  2,110 = 2,110 / 1.0 
16  1,000 = 1,800 / 1.8 
17  Both the household disposable income (to be attributed to each member within the household) and the 
individual  equivalent  weight  are  unambiguously  low er  in  a  “fiscal”  framework,  compared  to  the 
“residence” one. But the impact on the individual ratio is qualitatively unknown ex ante (see example in 
Table 2.2), as well as the average evolution of the equivalised income throughout the population. 
18  When the weighting of cases (designed for better fitting the Luxembourg population) is implemented / 
taken into account. 
19  Of course, the adaptation/selection procedure just described may help. Moreover, the weighting process 
of the survey data is also based on administrative data sources partially overlapping our administrative-
based  dataset.  Nevertheless,  this  was  not  at  all  a  priori  a  guarantee  for  comparability  for  fiscal 
households.  
20  Primary  income =  gross  employment  and  self -employment  income  +  gross  inv estment  and  property 
income (excluded from results in  Table 3.3, for comparability reasons) + maintenance payments + gross 
private pension benefits (low, on average, in Luxembourg) + apprentice income. 
21  Nordberg (2003) gets for Finland a level of «  earned income » (close to our « primary income”) lower for 
register data in 1995 but higher in 1999. 
22  If a confidence level of 99%, the conclusion does not change. 
23  For  example,  as  a  proxy  for  “institutional  households”,  all  individuals  more  than  75  years  old  and 
mentioned  as  “single  without  dependent”  are  dropped  from  both  the  administrative-based  dataset 
(“institutional households” included in initial data) and survey-based data (for symmetry reasons).  
24  The mean primary income goes from 1,384 up to 1,464 on  the administrative-side, from 1,493 up to 
1,539 on the survey-side, with, for the latter, a confidence interval changing to [1,459 - 1,619]. 
25  This information is partially available in the input datasets. While simulating through EUROMOD, we 
avoid the question of non-take-ups and, on top of that, dissimilarities due to differing levels of non -take-
ups that might be observed in administrative-based and survey-based data. 
26  The Atkinson inequality index can be expressed as     , where n is the number of 
individuals, xi is the income level,   the average income and   the inequality aversion coefficient. It takes a 
value between 0 (minimum inequality) and 1 and can be interpreted in terms of social welfare : it shows 
that  part  of  total  income  which  might  be  saved,  while  keeping  the  social  welfare  (associated  to  the 
Atkinson index) unchanged and distributing the remaining disposable income equally. See Essama (2000) 
and Lambert (1993). 
27  The Gini coefficient takes a value between 0 (minimum inequality) and 1. If we define the social welfare as  
  ,  then  it  can be  shown  that  ,  where  n  is  the  number  of 
individuals, xi/j is the income level,   the average income and G the Gini inequality index. See Essama 
(2000) and Lambert (1993). 
28  These would be fully compatible in all cases if a 99% confidence interval. 
29  A decomposition of inequality indices by population sub-group could also enlighten the question. 
30  The  95%  confidence  interval  for  the  a verage  poverty  rate  through  survey -based  data  is   
[8.4% - 10.7%]. 
31 Only couples with 3 dependents or more are signaled less at -risk-of-poverty through survey-based than 
administrative-based data. 
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32  Table 3.5 helps in understanding the reason why, concerning the whole population. With ratio of mean 
income between the first decile (nearby the poverty line) and the fifth one (close to median income) of 0.55 
(= 47% / 85%) in administrative-based data, to be compared with 0.46 for the survey-based data, we can 
expect that fewer members of the first decile in the administrative-based data are to be trapped below the 
poverty line. 
33  The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty index with parameter 1, which is the product of the poverty rate and 
the  income  gap  ratio,  is  sho wn  to  be  0.027  through  survey -based  data  ( resp.  0.013  through 
administrative-based data), leading to an income gap ratio of 0.027/0.096 = 28% (resp. 18%). The income 
gap ratio = 1 – (Mean income of the “poor”/Poverty line) : it refers to the extent to which the incomes of 
the poor lie below the poverty line. 
34  A “Single with dependent(s)” is most often a single parent with dependent child(ren). See Table 3.1. 
35  See Callan and Walsh (2006) for a proposal of alternative benchmarks, including a “distributional neutral 
policy”, mainly appropriate when a comparison between countries. 
36  As it is presently designed, neither feedback effects through prices or budget constraints, nor behavioral 
answers.  Moreover, EUROMOD is static which means that the time dimension (hence links through time) 
is not included in the model. 
37  See section 3.3. 
38  Vertical redistribution consists in reducing inequalities of equivalised income between households who 
have the same structure, but a different income level.  
39  Horizontal redistribution consists in reducing inequalities of equivalised income between households who 
have the same income level, but a different structure. 
40  The  increase  in  progressivity  can  be  explained  by  an  enlargement  of  the  first  tax  bracket   
(tax rate = 0%) which overcomes, regarding the measurement of progressivity through the Kakwani index, 
the effect of reducing the marginal tax rates for higher income levels. 
41  We could also compare mean income for deciles determined from the income distribution when no  tax 
reform, on one side, to deciles determined with the tax reform implemented, on the other side (the result 
is not reported in the paper but available on demand). We preferred the above presentation which leaves 
the members of the deciles unchanged. 
42 There is no gain for first two deciles of more-than-65-years-old singles, which means that the members of 
those categories are taxed neither with nor without the reform. As can be seen from  Table 3.5, the mean 
equivalised income (which is simply disposable income, for singles) for second decile is about 1,300 EUR 
/  month  or  15,600  EUR  /  year  for  more-than-65-years-old  singles,  which  is  below  the  threshold  for 
taxable income for “class 1a” tax payers (15,865 EUR in 2000, above later on). 
43  One counterexample  is to be found for 2 -workers’  households,  between  first  and  second  deciles,  in 
survey-data only. 
44  For example, singles with dependent(s) and households where nobody or one person only is working show 
an equivalised income more concentrated on the first deciles, compared to average (see Table 3.4), a first 
condition for lower taxation. 
45  For example, more-than-65-years-old singles are benefitting from the advantageous “class 1a” taxation 
when non-married (see appendix). The Luxembourg tax-benefit system is also exhibiting an important 
“family advantage” (Berger et al., 2002). 
46  Due to the tax reform, the poverty line is increasing from 1,188 EUR (see  Table  3.3)  to  1,254  EUR  
(+ 5.6%) when survey-based data, from 1,138 EUR to 1,199 EUR (+ 5.4%) when administrative-based 
data. 
47  See also Immervoll et al. (2006). 
48  See Figari et al. (2007). 
49  Which implies that working on categories is easier than with survey -based data where an appropriate 
procedure for the weighting of cases may be necessary. 
50  It may be important to know, as far as the tax -benefit system is concerned, how the value of a variable 
evolves during the year (e.g. in Luxembourg : the marital status). 
51  Out of the income characteristic, we have chosen to focus our attention on typologies based o n the age 
(<18, >= 60, others), the gender, the number of workers within the (fiscal) household and the type of 
household (single < 65, single 65+, single with dependents, couples with 0/1-2/3 dependents). 
52  Several determinants play indeed a role when ca tegories are compared and cannot always be easily 
disentangled : the overall distribution of disposable income, the composition of households and the 
 18 NOV 2008  Berger, Islam, Liégeois and Wagener  -  Version IJM  Page 35  
 
 
characteristics  of  the  tax-benefit  system.  This  complexity  explains  why  impacts  on  categories  of 
populations, in terms of relative gain and ranking, may depend on the criteria shown up. 
53  A residence household is defined as all persons “living together” at the same address.  
54  To the nearest lower multiple of EUR 50, from 2002 on. 
55  Example : In 2002, a married couple with adjusted taxable income = 30,000 EUR will be attributed a tax 
liability of 1,074 EUR = 2 * 537 EUR (tax liability for an income of 15,000 EUR when “single” without 
children). 
56  1,620,000 LUF (1 EUR = 40.3399 LUF). 
57  Example : a lone parent with children whose taxable income is 30,000 EUR is attributed a tax liability of 
4,970 EUR [tax liability when a “class 1” tax payer whose income is 30,000 – 25% * (40,159 – 30,000) = 
27,460 EUR]. NB : the “complement” calculation is performed only if the adjusted taxable income is less 
than the basis (40,159 EUR). Moreover, if leading to a negative outcome, the value is set to “0”. 
58  Formally, this means that when an increase of income by 1000 EUR, the supplement in tax liability can 
never exceed, in 2000, 460 EUR for “class 1a” tax payers. 
59  360,000 LUF. 
60  640,000 LUF. 
61  Example : a young single without children (hence « class 1 ») whose adjusted tax income is 9,000 EUR in 
2000 should have paid, given the schedule for his class, a tax of 161 EUR. Nevertheless, this would result 
in  a “net” income of 9,000 – 161 = 8,839 EUR, which is below the threshold of 8,924 EUR, hence leading 
to a reduction of the tax down to 76 EUR and a net of 8,924 EUR. 
62  1,560,000 LUF. 
63  Example : a lone parent (with children) whose taxable income is 30,000 EUR in 2002 is now attributed a 
tax liability of 1,125 EUR [tax liability when a “class 1” tax payer whose income is 30,000 – 50% * (39,000 
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